Multi-secret sharing scheme has been well studied in recent years. In most multi-secret sharing schemes, all secrets must be recovered synchronously; the shares cannot be reused any more. In 2017, Harn and Hsu proposed a novel and reasonable feature in multiple secret sharing, such that the multiple secrets should be reconstructed asynchronously and the recovering of previous secrets do not leak any information on unrecovered secrets. Harn and Hsu also proposed a (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme that satisfies this feature. However, the analysis on Harn-Hsu's scheme is wrong, and their scheme fails to satisfy this feature. If one secret is reconstructed, all the other unrecovered secrets can be computed by any t − 1 shareholders illegitimately. Another problem in Harn-Hsu's work is that the parameters are unreasonable which will be shown as follows. In this paper, we prove the incorrectness of Harn-Hsu's scheme and propose a new (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme which is extended from Harn-Hsu's scheme; our proposed scheme satisfies the feature introduced by Harn and Hsu.
Introduction
Secret sharing scheme [1, 2] is a useful fundamental cryptographic protocol that can protect information security among a group of participants. In traditional (t, n) secret sharing scheme, each of the n participants keep a share of secret s in such a way that any t or more participants can reconstruct the secret s; less than t participants cannot get any information on s. Secret sharing scheme is a useful fundamental to other cryptographic protocols [3, 4] . Due to the low efficiency in secret reconstruction of traditional (t, n) secret sharing scheme (shares are used to reconstruct only one secret), multiple secret sharing becomes more popular in recent years [5] [6] [7] which can improve the use efficiency of the shares.
In most multiple secret sharing schemes, all secrets are reconstructed synchronously. This characteristic would limit its applications in some asynchronous systems. In [8] , Harn and Hsu introduced a new feature such that in multiple secret sharing, the multiple secrets should have the capability to be reconstructed asynchronously. Multiple secret sharing scheme with this new feature would adapt higher secure requirement in some asynchronous *Correspondence: zhangtong@xaut.edu.cn Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, China systems; it can expand application background of multisecret sharing. In [8] , a (t, n) multi-secret sharing based on bivariate polynomial was also proposed to fit the new feature (many verifiable secret sharing schemes were based on bivariate polynomial [9, 10] ). However, their scheme does not satisfy the new feature. Their analysis is incomplete and ignores a wise attack from inside attackers. In addition, the parameters in their scheme are not reasonable either.
In this paper, we propose a wise attack from inside attackers and prove Harn-Hsu's scheme does not satisfy the new feature, and analysis why their parameters are unreasonable. Although their scheme does not work, the new feature of asynchronous secret reconstruction is worthwhile to be studied. Next, we introduce a new (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme that can satisfy the new feature.
Review on Harn-Hsu's scheme
In [8] The proposed (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme based on bivariate polynomial in [8] is briefly described below.
Harn-Hsu's scheme

Share generation phase:
• A dealer selects a bivariate polynomial F(x, y) over GF(p), where the x has degree t − 1 and y has degree h − 1. The k multiple secrets are
.., n and sends f i (x), g i (y) to each shareholder P i as their shares. v i is the identity of shareholder P i which is public information to all shareholders.
Secret reconstruction phase:
• Let P 1 , P 2 , ..., P t be involved in this phase. Any pair of (P i , P j ) computes a common pairwise key
, each one of these t shareholders computes his Lagrange component on s r respectively.
• Each shareholder P i , i = 1, 2, ..., k sends share information on s r to other k − 1 shareholders P j , j = 1, 2, ..., k, j = i using the secure channel which is built up by K i,j .
• Each shareholder can reconstruct the secret s r using the Lagrange formula.
There are two main contributions of the above scheme. F(x, y) . As a result, the last secret cannot be reconstructed.
Contribution 1
establish t + h independent equations on those th coefficients from their shares; therefore, any t − 1 shareholder can build up (t − 1)(t + h) equations. Suppose k − 1 secrets have been recovered which means that k − 1 additional equations are built. Since the parameters t, h, k satisfy th > (t + h)(t − 1) + (k − 1), this means t − 1 shareholders cannot get enough independent equations on those th coefficients to recover
Comments on Harn-Hsu's work
In this part, we will show that the conclusion of above Theorem 1 is not correct. t − 1 shareholders do not need to reconstruct F(x, y) to compute unrecovered secrets; there exists a wise attack from these t − 1 shareholders.
Theorem 2 In Harn-Hsu's work, any t − 1 shareholder can recover all k − 1 secrets with only one reconstructed secret.
Proof The k multiple secrets in Harn-Hsu's work is F(x, 0) , then the k secrets are k points on the f (x) (s i = f (i)) which is of degree t − 1. On the other hand, each shareholder receives a share g i (y) = F(v i , y) from a dealer; he can compute a value g i (0) = F(v i , 0) = f (v i ) which is also a point on f (x); t − 1 shareholders would have t − 1 points on f (x). Therefore, once a secret s r is reconstructed, any t − 1 shareholder can obtain t − 1 + 1 = t points on a t − 1 degree polynomial f (x), then f (x) can be reconstructed by the Lagrange formula; all the other secrets s i , i = 1, 2, ..., k, i = r are recovered by these t − 1 shareholders.
In addition, Harn-Hsu's scheme requires that th > (t + h)(t − 1) + (k − 1), which means the parameter h would be as large as t 2 . In this case, the size of share g i (y) = F(v i , y) for each shareholder is expanded too much comparing with other multi-secret sharing schemes which is also unreasonable in practical applications.
Proposed scheme
Although Harn-Hsu's work fails to satisfy the feature of asynchronous secret reconstruction, this new feature is still reasonable and practical. In this part, we propose a new (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme which is fit for the new feature. Our scheme is also based on a bivariate polynomial which is inspired by Harn-Hsu's work.
Share generation phase:
• A dealer selects a bivariate polynomial F(x, y) over GF(p), where both x and y have degree t − 1. The t multiple secrets are F(x, v i ), i = 1, 2, . .., n and sends f i (x) to each shareholder P i as their shares. v i is the identity of shareholder P i which is public information to all shareholders.
Secret reconstruction phase:
• F(x, 0) . In order to recover secret s t , these t − 1 shareholders need to obtain one more point on f s (x). However, these t − 1 shareholders can build no more linear equation on the t coefficients of f s (x) at all based on the property of asymmetric bivariate polynomial [5, 6] . In other word, with t − 1 recovered secrets s 1 , s 2 , ...., s t − 1 , any t − 1 shareholders will find that each value u ∈ GF(p) could be the last legal secret s t , and they have equal probability such that
. Therefore, t − 1 shareholders cannot reconstruct the secret s t with all previous reconstructed secrets.
In [8] , each pair of shareholders computes a common pairwise key using their shares which can be used to build up a secure channel between any two shareholders. This secure channel can protect information from attack of outsiders. In the above scheme, no pairwise key exists and all t shareholders can share a common key to build up a secure platform. The security level from one common key is weaker than pairwise keys between any two shareholders. Therefore, we can improve our proposed scheme which is shown in the revised scheme below.
Revised scheme
Share generation phase:
• A dealer selects an asymmetric bivariate polynomial F(x, y) over GF(p), where both x and y have degree t − 1. The t multiple secrets are
where both x and y have degree t − 1.
and sends f i (x) to each shareholder P i as their shares. v i is the identity of shareholder P i which is public information to all shareholders.
and sends u i (x) to each shareholder P i Secret reconstruction phase:
• Let P 1 , P 2 , ..., P t be involved in this phase. Each pair of
.) Then they build up a secure channel using K i,j .
• Same as in the proposed scheme, but transmits information using secure channels.
The revised scheme satisfies both Contributions 1 and 2 in Harn-Hsu's work, and the size of share is much smaller than their scheme. Comparisons between HarnHsu's work and our schemes are shown in Table 1 .
Both our proposed scheme and its revised version are reasonable and practical. In a system that requires high secure level, the revised version is more practical; otherwise, our proposed scheme has advantage in a system that requires higher computational efficiency and speed. 
